DAFI 91-101 — index record
| Number | DAFI 91-101 |
|---|---|
| Title | AIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY PROGRAM |
| Published | July 16, 2025 |
| Certified current | July 16, 2025 |
| Office of primary responsibility | AF/SE |
| Issued by | Headquarters, Department of the Air Force |
| Status on the index | Current |
| Last index action | IC, July 30, 2026 |
| Source index | Air Force e-Publishing |
| Index last read | October 20, 2026 |
Copied from Air Force e-Publishing (index). The publication itself is the authority; this page does not summarize or interpret it. Verify the current edition on the index before acting.
From the publication itself
Text below is lifted mechanically from the official PDF (75 pages, read October 20, 2026) with no editing or interpretation. Quote the document, not this page.
Purpose, in the publication’s words
1.1.1. The purpose of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program is to maximize nuclear weapons surety, consistent with operational requirements, throughout nuclear weapon lifecycle in accordance with (IAW) Nuclear Weapon Surety Standards. 1.1.2. This instruction directs positive measures to prevent unauthorized activation of critical functions, to include unapproved or inadvertent authorization, pre-arming, arming, launching, releasing, and navigation validation and to protect against inherent risks and threats, throughout the stockpile-to-target sequence. Provides positive measures to ensure approved hardware and software are used only with the systems they are certified for. Once a weapon system is certified as a nuclear weapon system it remains a nuclear weapon system regardless of mission capable status until formal nuclear safety design decertification is completed IAW this instruction. 1.1.3. This document serves as the parent instruction to the following 91-1XX publications:
Summary of changes, as printed
This interim change provides minor changes to a few key policies. Modifications are provided for side flash protection. Modifications are provided for deviations to nuclear design criteria. Modifications are provided for some roles and responsibilities. Modifications are provided in the organization of requirements for storage and operational use of critical components. Modifications are provided to explosives storage requirements. Modifications are provided for better clarity. A margin bar (|) indicates newly revised material.
Contents
- Chapter 1—INTRODUCTIONp. 6
- Chapter 2—ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIESp. 8
- Chapter 3—AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY COUNCILp. 25
- Chapter 4—AIR FORCE INSTALLATION LEVEL NUCLEAR SURETY PROGRAMp. 28
- Chapter 5—AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROGRAMp. 37
- Chapter 6—NUCLEAR SURETY TAMPER CONTROL AND DETECTION PROGRAMSp. 48
- Chapter 7—CRITICAL COMPONENTSp. 53
- Chapter 8—TROUBLESHOOTING AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONSp. 56
- Chapter 10—AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN DEVIATIONSp. 63
- Chapter 11—ANNUAL NUCLEAR SURETY REPORTp. 68
- Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATIONp. 69
All 92 contents entries
- Chapter 1—INTRODUCTIONp. 6
- 1.1. Purposep. 6
- 1.2. Nuclear Weapons Surety Standardsp. 6
- 1.3. Commanders and Directorsp. 7
- Chapter 2—ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIESp. 8
- 2.2. Air Force Chief of Safety (AF/SE) shall:p. 8
- 2.3. Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (AF/A3) shall:p. 10
- 2.6. Nuclear Weapon System Surety Group shall:p. 11
- 2.8. MAJCOMs Nuclear Safety Design Deviation Reporting Program OPR shall:p. 13
- 2.9. Air Force Materiel Command Commanderp. 13
- 2.10. Program Executive Officers shall:p. 14
- 2.12. Air Force Global Strike Command Commander shall:p. 16
- 2.13. US Air Forces in Europe Commander shall:p. 16
- 2.14. Air Education and Training Command Commanderp. 17
- 2.16. MAJCOM Weapons Safety Office shall:p. 17
- 2.17. Numbered Air Force Weapons Safety Managers shall:p. 18
- 2.18. Joint Basingp. 18
- 2.19. Commanders of Organizations Possessing Critical Components shall:p. 18
- 2.20. Wing or Installation Commanders shall:p. 18
- 2.21. Wing/Delta Commanders Without a Nuclear Mission shall:p. 19
- 2.22. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Commanders shall:p. 19
- 2.23. Wing/Delta/Installation Level Weapon Safety Managers will:p. 19
- 2.24. Maintenance Squadron Commander shall:p. 21
- 2.25. Civil Engineer Commander shall:p. 21
- 2.26. Security Forces Commander shall:p. 22
- 2.27. Unit/Squadron Commanders shall:p. 22
- 2.28. Unit Safety Representatives shall:p. 23
- 2.29. Supervisors shall:p. 23
- 2.30. Individuals shall:p. 23
- Chapter 3—AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY COUNCILp. 25
- 3.1. Overviewp. 25
- 3.2. Purposep. 25
- 3.3. Membershipp. 25
- 3.4. Responsibilitiesp. 26
- Chapter 4—AIR FORCE INSTALLATION LEVEL NUCLEAR SURETY PROGRAMp. 28
- 4.1. Purposep. 28
- 4.2. Wing/Installation shall:p. 28
- 4.3. Host Tenant Agreementsp. 28
- 4.4. Explosives Storage Requirementsp. 29
- 4.5. Training Programsp. 33
- 4.6. Tamper Control and Detection Programsp. 35
- 4.7. No-Lone Zone Programsp. 35
- Chapter 5—AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROGRAMp. 37
- 5.1. Overviewp. 37
- 5.2. System Safety Groupsp. 37
- 5.3. Items Requiring Nuclear Safety Design Certificationp. 37
- 5.4. Administrative Certificationp. 39
- 5.5. Targeting Datap. 40
- 5.6. Nuclear Safety Design Certification Processp. 40
- 5.7. Special Test and Maintenance Programsp. 42
- 5.8. Warhead and Bomb Maintenance or Test Proceduresp. 42
- 5.9. Nuclear Safety Design Removal and Restrictionsp. 43
- 5.10. Side Flash Protectionp. 43
- 5.11. Software Advisory Groupp. 46
- Chapter 6—NUCLEAR SURETY TAMPER CONTROL AND DETECTION PROGRAMSp. 48
- 6.1. Tamper Control Programp. 48
- 6.2. TPC Requirementsp. 48
- 6.3. TPC Violations and Reportingp. 48
- 6.4. Authorized Deviationsp. 49
- 6.5. Additional Conditionsp. 50
- 6.6. Tamper Detection Indicatorsp. 51
- 6.7. Sealing Methodsp. 51
- Chapter 7—CRITICAL COMPONENTSp. 53
- 7.1. Critical Componentsp. 53
- 7.2. Designating Critical componentsp. 53
- 7.3. OPCERT and DECERT of Critical Componentsp. 53
- 7.4. Marking Critical Componentsp. 54
- 7.5. Shipping Requirementsp. 54
- 7.6. Storage Requirements and Operational Use of Critical Componentsp. 54
- Chapter 8—TROUBLESHOOTING AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONSp. 56
- 8.1. Introductionp. 56
- 8.2. Faultsp. 56
- 8.3. Critical Faultsp. 57
- 8.4. Allowable Operationsp. 58
- 8.5. Nuclear Operations in Explosive Storage Spacesp. 58
- 8.6. Operations Outside of Certified Technical Datap. 58
- 8.7. Field-level Maintenance Personnelp. 58
- 9.1. Criteria Unique to Aircraft Systemsp. 59
- 9.2. Criteria Unique to Ground-Launched Missile Systemsp. 60
- 9.3. Internal Weapons Componentsp. 61
- Chapter 10—AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SAFETY DESIGN DEVIATIONSp. 63
- 10.1. Introductionp. 63
- 10.2. The Air Force Nuclear Safety Design Deviation Programp. 63
- 10.3. Safety Design Deviation Approval Authorityp. 63
- 10.4. Nuclear Safety Design Deviation Categoriesp. 64
- 10.5. Submission Process for Nuclear Safety Design Deviationsp. 64
- 10.6. Deviation Cancelationp. 66
- 10.7. Updated Nuclear Safety Design Requirementsp. 66
- Chapter 11—ANNUAL NUCLEAR SURETY REPORTp. 68
- 11.1. Overviewp. 68
- 11.2. Timelinep. 68
- Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATIONp. 69
Other DAFI publications nearby in the series
- DAFI 91-101_ACCSUPAIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY PROGRAM2020-11-03
- DAFI 91-101_AFGSCSUPAIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY PROGRAM2026-09-23
- DAFI 91-101_AFMCSUPAIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY PROGRAM2025-11-21
- DAFI 91-101_AMCSUPAIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY PROGRAM2026-02-11
- DAFI 91-101_USAFE-AFAFRICASUPAIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY PROGRAM2023-07-24
- DAFI 91-202THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (DAF) MISHAP PREVENTION PROGRAM2020-03-20
- DAFI 91-202_ACCSUPTHE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (DAF) MISHAP PREVENTION PROGRAM2025-12-03
- DAFI 91-202_AETCSUPTHE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (DAF) MISHAP PREVENTION PROGRAM2025-05-09
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